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This paper discusses the nature of entrepreneurship and its relation to innovation 
along a cycle in which exploration and exploration follow upon each other. We place 
the roles of entrepreneurship in innovation policy within this cycle of innovation. 
Different types of innovation along the cycle of innovation are realized with different 
forms of entrepreneurship, which are constrained or enabled by different legal 
institutions. One of the key roles of governments is to design, change or destruct 
institutions in order to improve societal welfare. The question is what governments 
should do in the context of innovation policy. Here, social scientists can make a 
contribution by providing insight into what entrepreneurship and innovation is 
(theories about these phenomena), and how institutions affect them in reality 
(empirical evidence about their effects). This requires social scientists to be engaged 
scholars and to provide new policy options as an honest broker between the 
academic world and the policy world. The key question of this paper is: How can 
policy best enable innovation based entrepreneurship? The answer is derived from 
looking at both theoretical tenets and empirical evidence using an institutional 
design perspective, which aims at providing arguments for the design, change 
and/or destruction of institutions, given the goals of the governments. We provide 
an overview of some (empirically tests of) institutions that enable or restrain 
particular types of entrepreneurship. Examples of these institutions are intellectual 
property rights and the Small Business Innovation Research program, employment 
protection, and non-compete covenants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a context of increasing international competition and ageing populations, many 
western governments feel the urge to stimulate innovation in order to secure long term 
wealth creation. This means that next to the traditional economic criteria of efficiency 
and equity, innovation is now a more central criterion for economic policy. Innovation is 
also seen as a tool to move nations through economic crises more quickly and position 
the nations to have a stronger economy as crises ease. Economic crises may also yield an 
opportunity to turn destruction into the creative destruction of innovation. Several policy 
instruments are considered in innovation policy, ranging from investments in public 
R&D, subsidizing private R&D and cooperation for innovation, to stimulating 
entrepreneurship. The latter area is receiving increasing attention in innovation policy. 
The popularity of a policy instrument is not necessarily an indication of consensus about 
its effectiveness, or clarity about its content. Entrepreneurship is a fuzzy concept that is 
used in a confusing way not only in policy, but in academia as well. The same is true for 
innovation. Nevertheless, there are multiple arguments that innovation is a key 
mechanism through which entrepreneurs drive economic growth (see for example 
Audretsch et al. 2006, Baumol 2002, Landes 1998, Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986). 
 
In this chapter we provide a definition of entrepreneurship in the context of innovation, 
and discuss its role within a cycle of innovation. This cycle of innovation reflects the 
growth of knowledge in society: innovation is based on the knowledge base of a society 
and expands this innate knowledge base (cf. Nooteboom 2000; Metcalfe 2002). 
Increasing the set of future economic choices seems to be a reasonable policy in a context 
of radical uncertainty (Moreau 2004: 866):  
 
One of the main roles of public policy is indeed to minimise the risks of 
technological or behavioural lock-in by maintaining some diversity among the 
characteristics of market participants and thus in the economic trajectories 
followed. The central policy problem becomes that of increasing the probability 
and the profitability of experimental behaviour. Thus the attention of the 
evolutionary policy-maker shifts away from efficiency toward creativity. Nelson 
and Winter (1982) underline that when the neoclassical hypothesis of a given 
opportunity set is relaxed, the role of the state becomes to discover and to extend 
this opportunity set rather than to choose among this set to maximise a 
hypothetical social welfare function. 
 
Different types of innovation along the cycle of innovation are realized with different 
forms of entrepreneurship, which are constrained or enabled by different legal 
institutions. One of the key roles of governments is to design, change or destruct 
institutions in order to improve societal welfare. Governments typically have the 
authority to do this. We explicitly take the destruction of institutions into account, 
because (a) it is often much harder to abolish institutions than to create institutions, and 
(b) “inefficient economic institutions are the rule, not the exception” (North 1990a: 191). 
The question is what governments should do in the context of innovation policy. Here, 
social scientists can make a contribution by providing insight into what entrepreneurship   2 
and innovation is (theories about these phenomena), and how institutions affect them in 
reality (empirical evidence about their effects). This requires social scientists to be 
engaged scholars (cf. Van der Ven 2007) and to provide new policy options as an honest 
broker between the academic world and the policy world (Pielke 2007). With respect to 
institutions, the demand for social science knowledge is derived from the demand for 
institutional change (Ruttan 2006; 2008). Advances in social science could then be useful 
in policy practice. The key question of this chapter is: How can policy best enable 
innovation based entrepreneurship? The answer is derived from looking at both 
theoretical tenets and empirical evidence using an institutional design perspective, which 
aims at providing arguments for the design, change and/or destruction of institutions, 
given the goals of the governments. This perspective is closely linked to the new 
institutional economics (North 1990b; Williamson 2000) and mechanism design theory 
(Cramton 2008; Myerson 2008; Ruttan 2008). 
 
Traditionally economics principally deals with institutions in a minimal form, e.g. the 
necessity of institutions that secure property rights for markets to work. New approaches 
recognize that different institutions are appropriate in different circumstances, and deal 
with the positive and normative aspects of institutional diversity (cf. Djankov et al. 2003). 
According to the institutional economic approach to entrepreneurship, the rules of the 
game (institutions) that specify the relative payoffs to different entrepreneurial activities 
play a key role in determining whether entrepreneurship is allocated in productive or 
unproductive ways (Baumol 1990; cf. Murphy et al. 1991).  
 
From a policy perspective the issue at stake is how to design an innovation policy that 
targets but does not attempt to predetermine the outcomes of industrial development (as 
was the case with state investment planning in targeted industrial policies). This kind of 
innovation policy design falls between the targeted industrial policies that are (to some 
extent) determined by special interest groups on the one extreme, and general economic 
policies (like fiscal incentives for innovation investments and public investments in 
education and research) at the other. Targeted industrial policies are a reflection of a 
belief in the ability to optimally plan the allocation of resources in society. This is at odds 
with the fundamental uncertain and unpredictable nature of innovation. The latter 
characteristics do not preclude any role for government however. The role of government 
is to design institutions that enable the creativity that facilitates innovation, ultimately 
supporting economic progress (cf. McCloskey 1997). From an institutional design 
perspective, social science knowledge can play an important role in the rational design of 
institutional reform and institutional innovation. 
 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the nature of entrepreneurship and its relation to 
innovation, The next section provides a conceptual elaboration of innovation along a 
cycle in which exploration and exploration follow upon each other: this goes beyond the 
Schumpeterian notion of the innovation process that runs from exploration to exploitation 
only. We place the roles of entrepreneurship in innovation policy within this cycle of 
innovation. After these conceptual investigations of entrepreneurship and innovation, 
institutions move centre stage. In this final section we provide an overview of some 
(empirically tested) institutions that enable or restrain particular types of   3 
entrepreneurship. Examples of these institutions are intellectual property rights and the 
Small Business Innovation Research program (for new technology based firms), 




2. Entrepreneurship and innovation  
 
What is meant by entrepreneurship and how does it relate to innovation? 
Entrepreneurship and innovation are fuzzy concepts with multiple meanings. Innovation 
and entrepreneurship are often regarded as overlapping concepts. This can be traced back 
to the definition entrepreneurship put forward by Schumpeter (1934: 74), who defines 
entrepreneurs as individuals carrying out new combinations (i.e., innovations). 
Schumpeter distinguishes four roles in the process of innovation: the inventor, who 
invents a new idea; the entrepreneur who commercialises this new idea; the capitalist, 
who provides the financial resources to the entrepreneur (and bears the risk of the 
innovation project); and the manager, who takes care of the routine day-to-day corporate 
management. These roles are usually filled by different individuals (see, for example, 
Kenney,1986). The literature on entrepreneurship recognises a variety of entrepreneurial 
roles in economic change, all implicitly carrying with them an economically positive 
connotation. However, if entrepreneurs are defined to be persons who are ingenious and 
creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power, and prestige (Baumol 
1990), then it is expected that not all activities will deliver a productive contribution to 
society (cf. Murphy et al. 1991). There are a variety of other reasons that many 
entrepreneurs do not directly contribute to an increase in national income: some 
entrepreneurship is more adequately characterised as a non-profit-seeking activity (cf. 
Benz 2006). Greater independence and self-fulfilment are more often mentioned as 
important motivations to become self-employed than increasing earning power (EOS 
Gallup 2004). Empirical studies show that (on average) entry into self-employment has a 
negative effect on the monetary income of individuals (Hamilton 2000; Parker 2004). 
Being an entrepreneur may be rewarding because it entails substantial non-monetary 
benefits, like greater autonomy, broader skill utilisation, and the possibility to pursue 
one’s own ideas; i.e., more freedom (cf. Sen 1999). These wide ranging effects of 
entrepreneurship are reflected in the various aims of entrepreneurship policy, ranging 
from employment growth (lowering unemployment), flexibility of the economy, 
innovativeness of the economy, individual development, emancipation of females, and 
integration of ethnic minorities into host societies.  
 
There are dozens of definitions of entrepreneurship (Hebert and Link 1989; Thurik and 
Van Dijk 1998). There is certainly no one answer to the question of what the 
phenomenon entrepreneurship ‘truly’ is. Rather than looking for any essentialist, ‘really 
true’ definition of entrepreneurship we prefer to study different forms and functions of 
entrepreneurship. Taking all entrepreneurship definitions together, they broadly reflect 
two relatively distinct (but partly overlapping) phenomena (cf. Davidsson 2004). The first 
of those is the phenomenon that some people, rather than working for somebody else   4 
under an employment contract, strike out on their own and become self-employed.
1 This 
involves some element of innovation at start-up, and some degree of innovativeness is 
needed to survive. However, innovation is not central to this phenomenon. The second 
phenomenon involves the development and renewal of any society, market, economy or 
organisation, which is based on micro-level actors who have the initiative and 
perseverance to make change happen. Here, ‘entrepreneurship’ means the creation of new 
economic activities and organisations (‘Schumpeterian entrepreneurship’) as well as the 
transformation of existing ones (‘corporate entrepreneurship’).  
 
In the context of this chapter we focus on this second phenomenon, ‘entrepreneurship’. 
Some self-employed are innovative but most are not, and it is innovation that we are 
interested in. In order to narrow down the discussion we propose a working definition of 
entrepreneurship as ‘the introduction of new economic activity by an individual that leads 
to change in the marketplace’ (cf. Davidsson 2004). Change in the market place generally 
entails new kinds of value for users, or new ways to provide or deliver existing values. 
This means that we exclude some other interpretations of entrepreneurship (as non-
innovative self-employment) and parts of the innovation phenomenon (see figure 1). For 
example, we exclude non-market activities such as not-for-profit endeavours, changes in 
contract (e.g., from employee to self-employed) and internal, administrative or 
organisational changes that do not appreciably affect markets, but include 
intrapreneurship that is driven by individual action and changes the marketplace. We also 
exclude mere contemplation of new ideas or introduction of fatally flawed ones that do 
not change the market (directly or indirectly, via learning mechanisms). We thus do not 




Figure 1   Entrepreneurship, innovation, and self-employment 
                                                       
1 In a similar way, entrepreneurship is often equated with self-employment and SMEs in other EU 




Entrepreneurship  5 
 
Consistent with our definition of entrepreneurship as the introduction of new economic 
activity by an individual that leads to change in the marketplace, we can formulate 
several necessary conditions for entrepreneurship (cf. Shane 2003: 6-8): 
 
•  existence of entrepreneurial opportunities (environmental changes: technological, 
political/regulatory, social/demographic); 
•  difference between people (in their willingness and ability to perceive and act 
upon an opportunity); 
•  risk bearing: does demand exist? can the entrepreneur compete with others? can 
the value chain be created? etc.; 
•  organising (realising the opportunity); either creating a firm, adapting a firm, or 
using the market mechanism (for example, licensing); 
•  innovation: recombination of resources into a new form that is by implication not 
a perfect imitation of what has been done before, and thus involves a change in 
the marketplace.  
 
These are necessary conditions for entrepreneurship. However, there are contingencies 
whether the individuals discovering an opportunity are employees or independent 
individuals, and whether new firms (spin-offs or independent start-ups) or incumbent 
firms (acquisitions or corporate venturing) are used for the realisation of the opportunity. 





Because the range of options and the consequences of exploring new things are unknown, 
entrepreneurial decisions cannot be made through an optimisation process in which 
mechanical calculations are made in response to a given set of alternatives (Baumol 
1993). People must be able to identify new means-ends relationships that are generated 
by a given change in order to discover entrepreneurial opportunities. Even if a person 
possesses the prior information necessary to discover an opportunity, he or she may fail 
to do so because of an inability to see new means-ends relationships. Unfortunately, 
visualising these relationships is difficult. History is rife with examples in which 
inventors failed to see commercial opportunities (new means-ends relationships) that 
resulted from the invention of important technologies – from the telegraph to the laser.  
 
Every entrepreneur who starts a new business has ideas. The real challenge is to discover 
an opportunity that is more than just a simple idea. These opportunities can be radical 
(Schumpeterian) or be incremental (Kirznerian). Entrepreneurial opportunities may 
originate from changes in the environment. These can be technological, social, 
demographic, political, or regulatory changes, but also general shocks to the economy (cf. 
Shane 2003). First, technological change, often based on progress in the research base of 
society (e.g. biomedical knowledge, or nanotechnology), is a prime source of 
                                                       
2 We are agnostic on the extent to which these opportunities are to be discovered or created (cf. Sarasvathy 
et al. 2003).    6 
entrepreneurial opportunities for new technology-based firms. Together social and 
demographic changes can be quantitative changes like an ageing population that offers 
new opportunities for entrepreneurs. It may also involve more qualitative changes: 
changing preferences or wants, for example reflected in the increase in the creative 
industries that satisfy new wants, or in the trend toward health and nutrition with its 
resulting demand for the supply of diet and organic food. In that sense people’s 
necessities are few but their wants are endless. Finally, political ad regulatory changes, 
such as deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation open up opportunities for 
entrepreneurship. Examples of privatisation as sources of entrepreneurial opportunities 
are the outsourcing of municipal services and the privatisation of the health care market, 
which have provided opportunities for high-growth start-ups.  
 
Until now, we largely left the definition and the discussion about the nature of innovation 
implicit. We explicitly deal with it in the next section. 
 
 
3. Cycle of innovation 
 
Innovation is about the development of new knowledge, introduced to the economy. This 
means that it starts with the cognition of the actors involved. This cognition is 
constructed from interactions of practices (see Nooteboom 2000; 2008). Based on this 
insight we arrive at an innovation process as a cycle or spiral of idea generation followed 
by development, commercialisation, market penetration, diffusion, consolidation, and 
differentiation, which lead to the beginning of invention. Thus this cycle of innovation 
goes beyond (Neo-)Schumpeterian theory, which includes only the notion of invention as 
new combinations, and the subsequent commercialization and production (Schumpeter 
1934). Where new combinations come from in invention is left unexplained. We see 
innovation as a cumulative process with discontinuities: today’s innovation stands on the 
shoulders of yesterday’s innovation, to paraphrase Merton (1993). Innovation is highly 
cumulative – building on earlier inventions, development, and applications but also 
discontinuous in its creative destruction. This nature of innovation - and growth of 
knowledge more generally - explains why the economy is never in equilibrium (Metcalfe 
2002). The cycle of innovation explains how exploitation and exploration succeed each 
other and emerge from each other (see figure 2).
3  
 
                                                       
3 Normally a linear approach is taken for explaining processes of innovation, ranging from the linear model 
of science to innovation (Bush 1945), to innovation diffusion models (Rogers 1962), to more recent 
innovation chain approaches (Roper et al. 2008).   7 
 
Figure 2  Cycle of innovation 
 
The proposal of a cycle of discovery (Nooteboom 2000) was originally inspired by the 
work of Piaget on the development of intelligence in children.
4 Here it is applied at the 
level of firms, products, and technologies within economies. How can such a shift of the 
level of analysis be justified? The claim here is that the cycle goes beyond empirical 
phenomena of child development. It represents a more general ‘logic’ of composition and 
break-up on the basis of experience, in an alternation of reducing variety of content, in 
the move toward consolidation (the upper half of figure 2), an opening up of variety of 
context, in generalisation (the lower half of figure 2), which leads on to a renewed 
opening of content, in novel combinations. A basic idea of the cycle is that application of 
existing knowledge and competence in novel contexts (e.g., new applications of theory 
and technology, new markets for existing products, new jobs for people), called 
‘generalisation’, leads to ‘differentiation’ of existing practice, for the sake of adaptation 
to the new selection environment. The new selection environment offers the room to 
deviate from the previously consolidated institutions that resulted from a previous 
innovation. In adapting a product or practice to new conditions, one first taps into earlier 
experience about how things might be done differently, based on experience from earlier 
rounds of innovation. If differentiation does not suffice in order to survive, or to profit 
from newly emerging opportunities, a further step is to allow oneself to be inspired by 
foreign practices encountered in the new environment, which appear successful or 
promising where one’s own practice seems to fail. This leads to experiments with 
combinations of known elements from existing practice and new elements from 
unfamiliar, local practices, called ‘reciprocation’. This yields hybrid practices. The 
history of technology offers many examples of the importance of hybrids in the 
                                                       










EXPLORATION EXPLOITATION  8 
development of radical innovations (Mokyr 1990). The significance of hybrids is that 
they allow one to explore the potential of novel elements without immediately 
surrendering the basic logic, structure, design principles, or architecture of established 
practice. The problem with hybrids is that they yield inefficiencies and inconsistencies in 
the system (‘spaghetti’), with overlaps, redundancies, misfits, and ‘work-arounds’ to 
resolve them. That leads to more radical, architectural change, in Schumpeterian ‘novel 
combinations’. The period of hybridisation gives insight into the elements one would 
most like to preserve, given their performance in the hybrid, and the directions in which 
one might think for novel principles of logic or architecture. Here, at this stage, small 
changes in design principles or basic logic can yield a drastic change in the functioning of 
the whole. At the same time, the inefficiencies and contradictions of hybrids also form a 
stumbling block: they may be seen as evidence of failure and lack of perspective for the 
innovation. Progress then depends on the perseverance of the entrepreneur or inventor. 
Also, the inefficiencies of reciprocation and hybridisation are difficult to sustain under 
the pressures of competition. This frequently leads to failure – because problems do 
indeed prove to be insurmountable or ongoing efforts and uncertainty cannot be sustained 
– but occasionally it leads to a breakthrough. The cyclical process of innovation indicates 
how one can set out in exploration along a path of exploitation. Crucial for the process, in 
the stages of generalisation and reciprocation, is the opening to novel contexts, with new 
challenges and opportunities, and openness in the form of curiosity and attention to 
unfamiliar practices and perspectives, and the willingness and opportunity to engage in 
experiments, and tolerance of the problems with hybrids. The cycle is illustrated in figure 
2.  
 
So far, the discussion of the cycle concerns the bottom half, in the transition from 
exploitation to exploration, which is relatively new in the innovation literature. The top 
half is more consistent with established innovation theory. Along the top half, in the 
emergence of a new idea or practice, in a novel combination, there is search for technical 
feasibility and commercial viability
5 of a new technology
6 or product and its optimal 
configuration, in the emergence of what in the innovation literature is called the 
‘dominant design’ (Utterback 1994; Geroski 2003). This leads to what is labelled 
                                                       
5 Entrepreneurs make conjectures about new combinations that are uncertain – that is, one cannot know (or 
even calculate the probability) ex ante whether these conjectures will be correct (Knight 1921). Several 
types of uncertainty can be distinguished: for example technical, market, and competition. The entrepreneur 
does not know in advance if the good or service she is producing will work, and, if so, if it can be produced 
at a cost less than the price at which it will be sold (technical uncertainty). The entrepreneur also does not 
know if demand will exist for the product, and, if so, if customers will adopt in large enough volumes, 
quickly enough, and at a high enough price, to make the effort profitable (market uncertainty). Finally, the 
entrepreneur does not know if she will be able to appropriate the profits from the exploitation of the 
opportunity or if they will dissipate to competitors. This uncertainty will only be resolved with entrance 
into the market (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 257-258), hence the description of the market as a discovery 
process. 
6 In contrast to Schumpeter’s time, the invention need not to be turned into a product in order to enter the 
market, since there are now well functioning markets for technology (see Arora et al. 2001). Companies 
that enter technologies markets do not have to invest in production-related activities but can focus their 
efforts on building stocks of intellectual property. The choice of entering the product or technology market 
is highly dependent on the appropriability regime and the extent to which complementary assets are held by 
existing companies (Teece 1986).   9 
‘consolidation’. In that process, if a breakthrough of an innovation succeeds, it faces the 
need to replace old practices; in Schumpeterian terms, ‘creative destruction’. Here, one 
runs into the problem that existing institutions, in the form of standards and regulations 
(technical, safety, commercial, fiscal, legal, administrative), market structures 
(distribution channels, installation, maintenance, repair), schooling and training, as well 
as established commercial positions, which form the existing selection environment, can 
block entry and change. In other words, in order to break through, innovation requires 
institutional change. As a result, due to institutional barriers radical innovations can often 
break through only later, and initially can only succeed where they can be fitted into the 
prevailing order of existing institutions and market structures. They need to prove their 
worth and their potential more extensively before obstacles can be cleared. It is a well-
known phenomenon that innovations initially do not find their application where their 
potential is highest but where the obstacles are lowest. 
 
Hence, openness of markets for new product entry, with a critical attitude toward 
established interests and institutions is an issue for innovation policy. One policy 
implication is that enabling entrepreneurs goes beyond helping them to find their way 
through the thickets of rules and regulations. It also requires gathering insights as to how 
obstacles may be changed to accommodate the shifts of innovation. 
 
In the movement toward consolidation, goals, means, and causal relationships between 
them become clear. As uncertainty decreases and familiarity with the novelty increases 
among potential users, demand increases, new producers jump into the emerging market, 
and price competition intensifies. Pressure on price creates pressure toward efficiency, on 
the basis of process innovation (by large firms: see Falck 2009). For pressures toward 
efficiency, standard economic analysis applies. Market mechanisms are needed to ensure 
optimal allocation of scarce resources (allocative efficiency) to known goals and means. 
In the drive toward efficiency, opportunities are taken to increase productive efficiency, 
by increase of scale, enabled by growing demand, which leads to concentration and the 
‘shake-out’ of less efficient producers. Here, usually in competition policy, mechanisms 
are oriented toward removing barriers to entry (see Audretsch et al. 2001). 
 
The fall of profits, in the transition from product innovation to process innovation, during 
consolidation, yields an argument for trying to be a leader, in the early stage of 
innovation, because thereby one captures the high profits of early partial monopoly, 
before imitation sets in (cf. Schumpeter 1942). As a follower, one enters at the stage of 
consolidation, where users profit from lower prices, but high profits have eroded. 
Furthermore early leaders may construct entry barriers to followers. As the history of 
capitalism has shown only an extremely small percentage of all start-ups make it to the 
position of industry leader (like e.g. Microsoft, Apple, Cisco, and Dell in ICT industries).  
 
Ongoing progress throughout the cycle is by no means guaranteed. The cycle is not to be 
seen as a logically necessary sequence but as a heuristic that generally works. In trying 
novel combinations, one may get caught in ongoing uncertainty and chaos (see figure 2), 
unable to settle the inconsistencies between new goals, means, and connecting causalities. 
Prototypes may continually fail to become viable, either technically or commercially.   10 
Rival designs, prototypes, or technical standards may continue to compete for a long 
time, and for the duration potential users are hesitant to commit themselves. After 
consolidation, one may get caught in inertia (see figure 2), particularly if there are no 
opportunities or incentives to escape to new contexts of application, or barriers to novel 
conditions being imposed from outside. In consolidation, institutions shift to 
accommodate the innovation, and once that has happened there are often strong pressures 
toward ‘isomorphism’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), with strong pressures to conform, 
by ‘coercion, mimesis (imitation) or normative pressures’. Vested economic interests 
protect existing institutions with installed bases of both tangible and intangible 
investments, existing competencies and efficiencies (accumulated in learning by doing), 
as well as market positions. Therefore, innovation requires openness to novel contexts of 
application, e.g., global markets, or new users or suppliers, as arenas for exploration and 
sources of novel challenges. Stages of the cycle may be skipped, in a leap to novel 
combinations without much intervening differentiation or reciprocation. The process may 
not proceed beyond any given stage. For example, differentiation, as a step in 
exploitation, may not proceed to reciprocation and novel combinations.  
 
Note that progress along the cycle is full of stress and potential conflict. In order to 
survive in novel contexts, innovators need to adapt their existing practices. In novel 
combinations innovators encounter stress in trying to have their innovation accepted, and 
established practices encounter the stress of creative destruction.  
 
The cycle of innovation provides the dynamic basis for the systemic view of innovation 
and innovation policy, in which innovation policy is concerned with stimulating and 
matching the knowledge producing elements (exploration) and knowledge exploiting 
elements (exploitation) of an economy. The cycle of innovation operates, more or less 
perfectly, depending on institutional conditions that inhibit or enhance the component 
processes of generalisation (opening up to new contexts); differentiation (deviation from 
established practice to survive in the new context); reciprocation (opening up to 
contributions from unfamiliar ideas or practices); experimentation with hybrids and new 
principles, interpretive schemes or architectures; convergence to a dominant design; and 
institutional change to accommodate the novelty. Innovation policy is not about the 
determining the content of innovation, but about enabling innovation processes. Crucial 
in this policy is the opening to new contexts with new challenges and opportunities, 
opening to collaboration for the exploration of novel combinations, opening in the form 
of curiosity and attention to foreign practices, and the preparedness to engage in 
experiments with elements from those and with surprising hybrids.
7  
 
Entrepreneurship in the innovation cycle 
 
It is customary to distinguish between equilibrium breaking, Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurship that yields ‘creative destruction’, and ‘Kirznerian’ entrepreneurship 
                                                       
7 The Renaissance in Europe was accompanied by a lively interest and use of many things that could be 
found elsewhere (Mokyr 1990). This stands in contrast to China, for example, which from around 1400 lost 
its prior advantage by closing itself off to foreign influences. Perhaps this helps to explain why the first two 
industrial revolutions occurred in Europe.    11 
(Kirzner 1973), which finds new market niches for existing or adapted products, in a 
process of what economists call ‘arbitrage,’ and thereby tends toward equilibrium. We 
can recognise this in the cycle of innovation: the movement toward consolidation can 
perhaps be seen as equilibration, and the movement away from it as disequilibration. 
Instead of two kinds of entrepreneurship, we can identify a larger range of different types, 
all along the cycle of innovation. Thus, there are entrepreneurs who make a new idea 
technically feasible, commercially feasible, productively efficient (e.g. Henry Ford in the 
automobile industry), eliminate entry barriers, carry it into new markets or applications, 
differentiate it, bring in new elements, in hybrids, or bring together elements from 
different practices in new architectures and thereby produce new concepts. 
 
Note that in the step of generalisation the actor who takes an existing product or practice 
into a new context is not necessarily an existing producer or practitioner. It may be an 
outside entrepreneur or user stepping in, or an employee spinning off from an existing 
firm, adopting the product or practice with his own specific experience and perspective. 
This, however, may already happen prior to consolidation, so that exploration may set in 
when exploitation has not settled down yet. Entrepreneurs adopting the innovation will 
inevitably, and not necessarily deliberately, colour their use of it according to their 
perspective, and seeing that the product is on its way to widespread diffusion and 
consolidation, with an erosion of profit, may already differentiate it deliberately. What 
we are saying here is that disequilibration may take place even during equilibration, 
which seems to make nonsense of the very notion of equilibration. Why would 
entrepreneurs move toward equilibrium if they know that it will erode profits? 
 
 
4. Institutions enabling/constraining entrepreneurship 
 
The economy would be in chaos without institutions,
8 one might even argue that 
economics –production, distribution and consumption – would not exist without 
institutions. Institutions are the rules that constrain behaviour - and in that way often 
reduce uncertainty, and transaction costs in particular - and enable (inter)actions. The 
most basic institutions that enable capitalist economies are property rights and the rule of 
law. In this paper we focus on how entrepreneurship, specified along the cycle of 
innovation, is enabled and constrained by institutions. A key question is which (formal) 
institutions governments should design to enable entrepreneurship, i.e. the introduction of 
new economic activity by an individual that leads to change in the marketplace. In 
practice, institutions are often not the product of intentional design,
9 and are often the 
outcome of a political process in which the interests of many stakeholders have to be 
satisfied. However that does not mean that there is no scope for institutional design.
10  
 
                                                       
8 Expanding on this: according to Hobbes (1651) society will be in chaos without institutions.  
9 Hayek (1978), for example, held that institutional change emerges out of organic processes, which he 
termed “spontaneous order”.  
10 This very much resembles mechanism design theory that evaluates how the rules that govern exchange 
and allocation impact the efficiency of alternative (market) institutions (Myerson 2008; Roth 2008).    12 
The relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship seems paradoxical, as the 
former reduces uncertainty in order to enable behaviour (North 1990b), while the latter 
involves judgement under uncertainty (Knight 1921; Casson 2003). This paradox is 
resolved by distinguishing different types of uncertainty (cf. Milliken 1987; Van 
Waarden 2001). For example, financial institutions are necessary to let financial markets 
work, so that entrepreneurs can acquire capital for investments with uncertain future 
returns. The latter uncertainties relate to whether the new product is technically viable, 
commercially viable, and whether the firm will not be outcompeted by rivals, while the 
former institutions for example reduce the uncertainties related to the value of money and 
creditworthiness of firms. Furthermore, institutions may also constrain the making of 
constraints and enable escape from constraints, creating uncertainty by keeping avenues 
toward innovation open, as in competition policy, or other elimination of entry barriers, 
which create the uncertainty of novel entry into markets. 
 
The question of which institutions governments should design to enable entrepreneurship, 
is not about more or less state or market, since markets require institutions that often only 
states can construct; it is about how the state can enable entrepreneurs to change the 
market. This also means that it might have to design institutions that constrain vested 
interests, or to abolish institutions that serve vested interests, in order to let entrepreneurs 
flourish.  
 
In order to focus our discussion of how institutions affect entrepreneurship, we will 
discuss particular types of entrepreneurship that according to the literature have relatively 
strong positive effects on economic growth: new technology based firms, spin-offs,
11 and 
high-growth start-ups. Spin-offs and new technology based firms are likely to be better 
indicators of exploitation of unused ideas than the general population of new firms, while 
they may also be involved in the exploration of ideas that have emerged out of the former 
exploitation of knowledge. High-growth start-ups are even stronger indicators of 
successful exploitation on a relatively large scale.  
 
                                                       
11 The focus here is on corporate spin-offs. University spin-offs differ in two important ways. First, non-
compete covenants are not a relevant issue for employees in (non competing) public sector organizations. 
Second, the nature of innovation in university spin-offs mainly involves the upper half of the innovation 
cycle, i.e. the process from invention to commercialization. Institutional conditions that are important for 
university spin-offs relate to the incentives for academic entrepreneurship (see Henrekson and Rosenberg 
2001), and the provision of seed capital, and lead users (for example via the SBIR program).    13 
Table 1. Types of entrepreneurship and institutions 
Type of 
entrepreneurship 
Position at the 
cycle of innovation 
Institutions  Enabling / 
constraining effects 
New technology 





































New technology based firms and patents 
 
Entrepreneurs wanting to develop new technologies and introduce them to the market 
face Arrow’s disclosure problem (Arrow 1962): the value of a new technology to any one 
buyer may be decreasing in the number of other potential buyers who have been able to 
evaluate the new technology due to information leakages in the valuation process (value 
rivalry). There is thus a risk of expropriation the ‘rights’ to use this new technology of the 
inventor if this invention has not been registered and protected by patent rights. The 
enforcement of patents or licensing agreements acts as an entry barrier that significantly 
reduces the potential for user reproducibility. Patent rights explicitly prevent would-be 
buyers from using the idea for commercial gain without the permission of the technology 
seller. The legal institution that solved this disclosure problem is the protection of 
intellectual property rights via patents (see Gans and Stern 2010). New firms that 
specialize in the development of new technologies can thus claim the property rights of 
the inventions involved and gain from trading the use rights of this invention with 
licensing on a market for technology (cf. Arora et al. 2001). The availability of 
intellectual property protection by patents has been instrumental in the rise of the number 
of new firms in knowledge intensive sectors like biotech and R&D services.
12  
 
New technology based firms and SBIR 
 
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is a public procurement 
programme aimed to subcontract socially relevant (i.e. fulfilling a public need) 
innovative research to small businesses. The program’s central goals are (1) meeting 
federal research needs with small business and (2) fostering commercialization of 
federally funded research (Cooper 2003). The US Congress enacted the SBIR program in 
                                                       
12 However, there is increasing evidence on the malfunctioning of the (US) patent system: see Jaffe and 
Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008).   14 
the early 1980s as a response to the loss of American competitiveness in global markets, 
especially in the face of the ‘Japanese threat’ (see Audretsch 2003). The birth of the SBIR 
program was the result of lobbying activities by the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
and the Small Business Administration (SBA) (Obermayer 2009). There was no clear 
design, but the program was constructed and evolved through a trial-and-error process 
taking into account both the political and administrative viability of the program. The US 
regulation underpinning the SBIR programme requires that 2.5% of all federal 
government agency external R&D budgets are distributed to small innovative businesses. 
Each year the SBIR program makes more than 4,000 awards to US small businesses, 
amounting to over $2 billion in value (Connell 2006). The SBIR consists of three phases: 
feasibility, development and commercialization. Phase I is oriented toward determining 
the scientific and technical merit (technological creativity) along with the feasibility 
(economic creativity) of a proposed research idea. A Phase I award (typically around 
$100,000) provides an opportunity for a small business to establish the feasibility and 
technical merit of a proposed innovation. This is a step generally ignored by private 
venture capital. Phase II awards are more selectively aimed at developing new 
technologies and products, which involves about 50% of the phase I award winners, and 
delivers up to $750,000. Phase III awards are funded from mainstream (i.e., non SBIR 
budgets), and add probably again as much as Phase I and II in total to overall R&D 
expenditure on SBIR projects (Connell 2006). These Phase III projects also bring small 
businesses the opportunity to win valuable sole supplier contracts with federal agencies. 
Some of the most innovative American companies, like Genzyme, Amgen, and 
Genentech—all three university spin-offs—as well as Apple Computer, Compaq, Intel 
and Qualcomm received early stage SBIR finance. Lerner (1999) shows that SBIR 
funded firms enjoyed substantially greater employment and sales growth than other 
similar firms. It is not just the size of the subsidy that is important for the recipients: these 
awards also play an important certification function, increasing the trustworthiness of the 
recipients (Lerner 1999; cf. Toole and Turvey 2009). This implies that the program’s 
project review and selection process identifies the quality of projects and firms, so that 
information asymmetries are reduced that normally are an important cause of the failure 
of financial markets to provide investment capital to these projects and firms.  
 
From an innovation policy point of view, the SBIR program has the general purpose of 
stimulating technological innovation, and the more specific purpose to tap into the pool 
of innovative potential of small businesses to meet federal R&D needs on the one hand, 
and to increase private sector commercialization of inventions derived from federal 
R&D: i.e. to stimulate novel combinations, technology development and 
commercialization in the innovation cycle. The evolutionary design of the program 
facilitates maximum experimentation, with minimal financial losses per experiment. The 
program also reduces the inherent uncertainty involved in technological innovation 
concerning the functionality of the technology, the ability to produce new technology 
based products, and the demand for the new product. In combination with providing 
‘venture capital’ for product development, the SBIR program reduces multiple barriers to 
technological innovation that are said to be especially harmful for new and small 
technology based firms (cf. Hall 2002).  
   15 
The program reduces the typical large firm bias in public procurement. Public 
procurement in general, and innovation procurement in particular, favours large firms for 
logical reasons: due to accountability of these larger and often long established parties, 
and the relatively low transaction costs for government procurement to a small set of 
large established firms. Procurement to a large set of small and new firms incurs more 
search costs, contract costs, and control costs. This problem is even more severe when the 
‘product’ subcontracted involves high uncertainties and many intangible assets, as is the 
case with subcontracting of innovative research. However, the downside of 
subcontracting to large established firms is that relatively incremental innovations will be 
sourced, due to the small variety of potential innovations, and the relative inert nature of 
larger long established firms. The problem then is how to source more radical forms of 
innovation, and solving the two (capital and product) market problems for new tech based 
firms. The SBIR program turned out to be an institutional change that solved these 
problems.  
 
Spin-offs and non-compete agreements 
 
Spin-off firms are a specific form of employee mobility, in which employees leave their 
former employer to pursue opportunities in their newly created and owner-managed legal 
entity. These entrepreneurs introduce ideas from their prior work experience to new 
contexts (generalization), and sometimes substantially differentiate these ideas in order to 
adapt to new selection environments (differentiation).  
 
A number of studies show that one particular legal constraint on employee mobility – 
employee non-compete agreements
13 – lowers the ability of employees to move from one 
firm to another (Gilson 1999; Fallick et al. 2006; Marx et al. 2009). These employee non-
compete agreements are intended to help firms protect their investments in human 
capital, intellectual property
14 and relationships: firms can increase their productivity by 
training their workers, by developing new products and processes, as well as by building 
valuable relationships with customers and suppliers (see Franco and Mitchell 2008). 
These non-compete agreements may also reflect the vested interests of incumbents that 
want to restrict the possibility of employees striking out on their own, and exploiting their 
knowledge outside the former employer. In this respect employee non-compete 
agreements may be a constraint on the creation of spin-off firms, which has been 
confirmed by several studies (Stuart and Sorenson 2003; Samila and Sorenson 2009).  
 
High-growth start-ups and employment protection 
 
Labour market regulations leading to large hiring and firing costs are negatively 
associated with new firm formation (Van Stel et al., 2007). This finding might reflect 
different mechanisms: relatively high opportunity costs for employees to become self-
                                                       
13 The fact that this is a non-compete agreement, means that this institution is of less relevance in non-
competitive settings of public research institutes and their potential spin-offs.  
14 Marx et al. (2009) showed that patents (the regular legal protection of inventions) and non-compete 
agreements are complements, not substitutes. Both are legal institutions to control knowledge, either 
embodied knowledge (non-compete agreements) or codified knowledge (patents).    16 
employed, constraints on the flexibility of highly uncertain innovative start-ups, or 
potential problems with attracting personnel for a growing new venture. There is some 
empirical evidence for all three mechanisms: Robson (2003) found that stricter 
employment protection legislation in OECD countries reduces self-employment;
15 Bosma 
et al. (2009b) found that the probability of individuals in European countries to start an 
innovative firm is negatively related to the strictness of employment protection, and 
Bosma et al. (2009a) found the same relation for the probability to start a new firm with 
high growth expectations. See Henrekson and Johansson (2009) for an extensive 
discussion of the effects of labour market institutions on the prevalence of high-growth 
firms.  
 
An overview of the reviewed institutions and their place along the innovation cycle is 
shown in figure 3.  
 
 





In this chapter we provide a definition of entrepreneurship in the context of innovation, 
and discuss its role in a cycle of innovation. This cycle of innovation reflects the growth 
of knowledge in society: innovation is based on the knowledge base of a society and 
expands this knowledge base. Different types of innovation along the cycle of innovation 
are realized with different forms of entrepreneurship, which are constrained or enabled by 
different institutions. One of the key roles of governments is to design, change or destruct 
                                                       
15 This is not that obvious, as the reverse might also be logical: strict employment protection legislation 




















protection  17 
institutions in order to improve welfare in society. The key question of this chapter is: 
How can policy best enable innovation based entrepreneurship? We take an institutional 
design perspective, which aims at providing arguments for the design, change and/or 
destruction of institutions, given the goals of government. This is illustrated by how four 
different formal institutions enable or constrain different types of entrepreneurship 
through the innovation cycle. These illustrations also show that it is unfruitful to see these 
institutions as either designed or as evolving spontaneously: the selection and 
consequential design and creation of institutions is both intended and unintended, which 
means that institutional learning becomes crucial.  
 
The translation of scientific insights into the world of policy practice has several caveats. 
First, the success of institutional design in the context of innovation policy remains 
uncertain due to unforeseen interdependencies and unintended side-effects. Bringing the 
nuances and contingencies in the effects of institutional change centre stage might 
constrain the adoption of these insights into the world of policy practice. However this 
should not be a ticket to the exclusive use of slogans and sound bites in the policy debate. 
The message should be simple enough to be communicated to broad non-scientific 
audience, but should have enough causal depth and contextual sensitivity in order to 
avoid harmful translations of academic insight.  
 
The second caveat concerns the dangers of evidence based policy. Evidence based in 
social sciences means building on academic publications in social science fields. In 
contrast to for example the medicine field of research, replication research is not greatly 
valued in social sciences (cf. Davidsson 2004, chapter 9; Evanschitzky et al. 2007). There 
is a tendency to publish success studies thus undersampling failures or zero-effect 
outcomes (cf. Denrell 2003). This means that the social science knowledge base on the 
effects of institutions on entrepreneurship and innovation more broadly is not likely to be 
an unbiased pool of insights for the design of institutions. In order to become a reliable 
pool of insights, social sciences should become more like the medical sciences and 
emphasize replication studies (over time and different contexts) and to engage as scholars 
with the actors involved in order to uncover the ways in which institutions affects their 
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